Omorogbe O. Victor
Department Of
Economics
Okada, Edo State-  Nigeria 
&
Woghiren Morgan
Department Of
Business Administration
Okada, Edo State-  Nigeria 
&
Atu-Omimi Ejoor
Kingsley
Department Of
Accounting
Okada, Edo State-  Nigeria 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to appraise the impact of
public policies on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria 
INTRODUCTION 
            One
of the goals of economic development strategies pursued by successive Nigerian
Governments has been the reduction of poverty through job creation. Ipso facto, many government policies
over the years for the achievement of that objective have been based on the
development of indigenous entrepreneurship. Of course, Nigeria USA 
            Job
creation through the free market and the empowerment of the private sector was
taught by Milton Friedman of the University 
 of Chicago China ,
India , Brazil 
            This
paper, however, hypothesizes that public policies in Nigeria 
OPERATIONAL
DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS 
            Many
definitions of public policy abound. Dye (1965) and Jones (1977) agree that
public policy is a public decision to achieve a purpose.  However, policy only lays down the general
directive rather than detailed instructions or strategies on the line of action
to follow to achieve the objective. 
Basically, public policies are formulated by the three arms of
government working in concert.  But,
policies can be initiated from para institutional
sources and from private persons. 
Ultimately all public policies in Nigeria 
            Entrepreneurship
as used in this paper refers to the activities of the entrepreneur as the
initiator, organizer, innovator and risk bearer in production or business. (See
Kent, Sexton & Vesper 1982).  The
entrepreneur is the person whose activities create wealth and employment which
can be measured either directly on through economic growth rates.  This definition is without prejudice to the
classification of entrepreneurs on a continuum from small craftsman
entrepreneurs to big time opportunistic entrepreneurs adopted by Inegbenebor
and Osaze (1999).  Whether big or small
entrepreneurs are all in business to make profit and grow their enterprises
(Carland et al 1984).  Their functions,
therefore, come under entrepreneurship as used in this paper.
THEORIES
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
            In
this paper we shall examine Schumpeter’s and McClelland’s theories of
entrepreneurship on which many public policies are based.  In Schumpter’s theory (1934).  The supply of entrepreneurship is a function
of the rate of profit a emulation and the “social climate.”  By this theory a vibrant profitable economy
encourages people to venture into entrepreneurship while any action tending to
squeeze profit such as increased bargaining power of trade unions, progressive
income and corporate taxes, will discourage enterprise.  Schumpeter uses the concept of “social
climate” to describe the whole lot of social, political and socio-psychological
environment within which the entrepreneur operates namely: educational system,
social values, class structure, reward system etc.  If these develop positively entrepreneurship
will strive (Higgins, 1968 p. 94).
            While
Schumpeter’s theory is basically environmental –social political and economic
–Mcclelland’s theory is purely psychological. 
He hinges entrepreneurship on the motive, the need for achievement.  This motive is a personality trait which can
be acquired through appropriate interventions or altitudinal changes such as by
training and development.  It is this
that unscores the success of the Indian Gujarat Model (Ekpenyong, 1989).
PUBLIC
POLICIES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
            Based
on the above theories and following the examples of other countries Nigeria 
1.         The indigenization Policy 1972/77
- Long –term credit delivery instructions.
2.         The Structural Adjustment Programmes 1986.
- Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) 1986
- National Directorate of Employment (NDE) 1986
- Raw Material Research and Development Council 1987
- The Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDP) 1987
- Export Promotion Council 1988
- Privatization, Commercialization and Deregulation Policies 1988
- National Industrial Policy 1988
- Economic Reconstruction Programmes 1988
- SMEII Loan Scheme 1989
- Monetary Policy Guidelines,
- On Lending Credit Institutions 1989
- The Establishment of Grass-Root Banks, EPZ decrees 34 of 1991 and 8 of 1996.
3.         The Nigerian Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies
           (NEEDS) 2004
- National Poverty Eradication Programmes (NAPEP)
- Bank Consolidation Exercise 2005.
- Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA)
            The
list is inexhaustible but as Ekpu (1992) humorously observed some of these
policies have been like changing one structure for another much like
‘exchanging a monkey for a baboon, recycling of ideas; a duplication of efforts
(which) turn out to be of doubtful relevance or simply a money –gazzling
machine”,
            The
research question here is: what has been the impact of these policies on entrepreneurship
development as measured by the rate of growth of the key sectors of the
economy; what is the correlation between the growth rates of manufacturing and
agriculture as a measure of the co-ordination of the public policy directives.  For the rest this paper we shall attempt to
appraise the conception, implementation and achievement of the key policies in
order to answer the above questions.
THE
NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION DECREES (NEPD) 1972 AND 1977
            During
the colonial period the development of indigenous entrepreneurship was not
encouraged by the colonialists who were content to see Nigerians as merely
rural producers of raw materials for the industries of the United Kingdom 
            To
provide the financial muscle needed by Nigerians to buy over the enterprises
which aliens were to sell the government set up the Nigerian Bank for Commerce
and Industries (NBCI) by decree No 22 of 1973 and acquired 40% equity
participation in the existing expatriate banks in order to influence sectoral
allocation of credit to Nigerian businesses. 
The establishment of NBCI was thought necessary because the existing
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) established in 1964 was up to this
time under foreign majority ownership and control and did not meet the
aspirations of indigenous entrepreneurs (Nwankwo, 1988).  The Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative
Bank (NACB) were also established in 1973 to transfer rural farmers to
commercial agriculturists.  The NEPD
decree 1972 was amended in 1977 by the Nigerian Enterprises promotion Decree No
3 of 1977 to make it more meaningful.
            Going
by the fact that the indigenization policy produced new generation of Nigerian
Managers, business executives and big time Nigerians shareholders it was a
success.  But observers (Biersteker,
1980) were worried that buying over shares in existing companies as portfolio
investors did not transfer sophisticated technology nor brought innovation to
business and therefore did not make one an entrepreneur.  There was no prior entrepreneurial
development programme like the Indian EDP -1 to prepare Nigerians for the take
over of foreign businesses.  This led to
the liquidation of many enterprises taken over. 
There was the Centre for Management Development (CMD) that organized
seminars for managers.  This was not
sufficient to develop the entrepreneurial skills for the long-run strategic
management of businesses.  Again many
Nigerians were not aware of the credit delivery institutions and those who were
aware did not benefit much as the banks did not lend without good collateral
securities which the bulk of the people could not afford.  The NEPD at best stimulated entrepreneurial
spirit and the capital issues commission established also in 1973 paved the way
for capital market development.  That the
decree was abrogated in 1996 meant that NEPDA had not produced the needed crop
of local entrepreneurs to exploit available resources and create employment,
hence the wooing of foreign investors to come back.
THE
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME  OF 1986
            While
Nigerians in the private sector were encouraged to take over alien business the
development plans – 1962 -68, 1970 -72, 1975 -78, 1981 -85 promoted the
establishment of big government owned import –substitution industrial (Big push
theory).  Between 1975 and 1995 over $100
billion was spent to set up about 120 public enterprises that relied on foreign
inputs (Business Times Feb. 17, 2003 p. 1). 
The private sector entrepreneurs instead of running their new businesses
taken over from aliens and developing new ones to provide food and intermediate
capital goods also became emergency contractors in the oil related business and
construction sites that mushroomed following post war reconstruction
programmes.  The result was heavy
reliance on the oil revenue to finance importation of inputs as well as food
and drugs by the government.  When oil
prices crashed in the 1980’s payment arrears piled up and created balance of
payment problems.  The surplus of N2, 402.4 million in 1980 cascaded to a
deficit of N3,020.80 million in 1981 (Ogundipe 1989, p.8). 
            It
was against the above ugly scenario that the Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAP) of 1986 was conceived to address the structural imbalances in the economy
and lessen the reliance of oil revenue. 
New policies under SAP were now designed to promote small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) that collectively generate more equity capital and
contribute more to G.D.P than a few big enterprises. (Ogba,1991).  Besides the SMEs also collectively generate
higher level of employment per unit of investment.  Government adopted the SAP standard policy
package (SSPP) of the IMF to reduce imports and promote exports.  It also favoured monetary and fiscal policy
adjustment, new exchange rate regime and trade policies, public sector reforms,
fiscal discipline and budget cuts.  It
also removed subsidies and adopted reliance on price mechanism.  These encouraged local entrepreneurs to
produce locally those goods that were hither to imported from the world
market.  A number of institutions were
also established to promote SAP as follows.
1.           
The
Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) 1986 was to
construct and rehabilitate federal roads and rural feeder roads so that farmer
can easily evacuate their produce.  But
as Akpan (1992) aptly described it DFFRI showed miles of performance on paper
with only inches of evidence in the field for the N2 billion it spent in its
first 6 ½ years of existence before it was scrapped off.
2.           
National
Directorate of Employment (NDE) was to provides opportunities for youth
employment and vocational skills acquisition, small sale industries and
graduate employment scheme as well as special public woks programme.
3.           
Raw
Material Research and Development Council 1987, was organise researches for the
development of local raw materials.
4.           
The
Entrepreneurship Development Programme EDP 1987, was a programme mid-wifed by
the federal ministry of employment, labour and productivity.  Being organise by a government agency it
turned out to be another conduit pipe to embezzle tax payers money/government
revenue.
5.           
Nigeria
Export Promotion Council NEPC 1988 was to facilitate the development of export
marketing by entrepreneurs.
6.           
Privatization
entailed the selling of inefficiently managed public business to private
investors.  Deregulation was to remove
protective laws to encourage competition.
            A
post mortem of SAP shows that it turned out to be a double –edged sword.  The crawling peg devaluation of the naira made
importation of needed inputs by the small and medium enterprises very
difficult.  Their increased demand for
bank loans to square up production cost also increased the rate of interest and
this resulted in a spiral inflation that hit harder on both producers and
consumers.  Many producers carried excess
capacity while other simply went under. 
This dismal situation is represented by table 1 below on the sectoral
annual growth rates (%) of agriculture and manufacturing industry from 1981 to
1990.
Table 1:
Sectoral Annual Growth Rates of Agriculture and Manufacturing Industry 
| 
Year | 
1981 | 
1982 | 
1983 | 
1984 | 
1985 | 
1986 | 
1987 | 
1988 | 
1989 | 
1990 | 
| 
Agric | 
-16.5 | 
2.5 | 
0.3 | 
-4.8 | 
16.8 | 
9.2 | 
-3.2 | 
9.8 | 
4.9 | 
4.2 | 
| 
Manuf. | 
15.1 | 
12.9 | 
-29.4 | 
-11.2 | 
19.9 | 
-3.9 | 
5.1 | 
12.8 | 
1.6 | 
7.6 | 
| 
Manuf. | 
15.1 | 
12.9 | 
-29.4 | 
-11.2 | 
19.9 | 
-3.9 | 
5.1 | 
12.8 | 
1.6 | 
7.6 | 
Source: World Bank 1999 World
Development Indicators Washington 
 D.C. 
Adapted from: Iyoha MA
&Itsede C.O. (2002) Nigerian Economy: Structure, Growth and Development.,
Benin: Mindex Publishing Co. p.23.
          The above statistics are revealing,
the table shows that there is a zero correlation between the rate of growth of
agriculture and manufacturing industry over the period of SAP. If SAP had made
an impact we would have a positive correlation and a simple linear regression
line with a positive slope; as agriculture increased, manufacturing also
increased since manufacturing received inputs from agriculture, all thing being
equal.  The zero correlation is therefore
evidence of uncoordinated policy directive. 
The conclusion is that all the funding initiated by SAP went down the
drains.
ECONOMIC
RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES OF 1988
            To
ameliorate the harsh economic conditions of SAP the concept of Economic
Reconstruction Programmes was conceived. 
The cardinal trust of the programmes was the establishment of on-lending
credit delivery institutions to assist SMEs on danger-list to retool,
restructure and refocus to their core businesses before SAP.  The institutions were to compliment the SMEII
loan scheme also introduced.  The
on-lending institutions were the following:
1.           
The
National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) (Decree 28 1989)
2.           
The
World Bank Facility, 1991
3.           
The
Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM).
            These
institutions used a number of participating banks as intermediaries.  This reduced this cost of lending. High cost
of lending was the bane of earlier development banks.  However, because of further devaluation of
the naira by over 70% in 1992, the institutions experienced massive loan
default and eventually became distressed (Mbaegbu 2006).
THE
GRASS ROOT BANKS OF 1989
            The
grass root banks were the Peoples Bank and the Community Banks.
            They
were to meet the credit needs of the craft men- entrepreneurs.  The Peoples Bank took off in 1989. It was later
accused of corruption before it was merged with the NACB to form the new
Agricultural, Rural and Co-operative Development Bank.
            The
Community banks were expected to carry out banking businesses at the local
community level.  however, many had
overtime become distressed because of bad management because many CBs drew
their managers from former employees of distressed banks who carried on with
their dysfunctional and unprofessional banking habits.
THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (NEEDS)
            One
of the cardinal points of NEEDS is the promotion of private enterprise through
improved infrastructure, promoting industry, agriculture and other sectors such
as information and communication technology. 
Not much evidence is available to access the impact of NEEDS save for
the banks consolidation exercise it has put in place to encourage financial
deepening and also the introduction of the GSM telephones.
Conclusion
            Public
policies aimed at promoting entrepreneurship in Nigeria 
1.                 
Post
independence era 1960 -66
2.                 
Post
war, Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Period, 1972 – 77
3.                 
Period
of Structural Adjustment Programme 1986 -88
4.                 
Period
of Economic Reconstruction and Grassroots Banks 1988 -1990
5.                 
Current
NEEDS period 2004 to date.
            Analysts
believe that the policy programmes were mere duplication of efforts given
different names.  They provided miles of
performance on paper but inches of evidence on ground.  Given the statistical evidence of lack of
co-ordination of efforts particularly during the SAP era; we uphold the null
hypothesis that public policies have not impacted much on entrepreneurship
development in Nigeria 
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